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aking notice of race is both risky and inevitable,
in medicine no less than in other endeavors.
The literature on race as a classifying tool in
clinical research poses this core dilemma: On the one
hand, race can be a useful stand-in for unstudied ge-
netic and environmental factors that yield differences
in disease expression and therapeutic response. On
the other hand, racial distinctions have social mean-
ings that are often pejorative or worse, especially when
these distinctions are cast as culturally or biologically
fixed. Our country's troubled past in this regard and the
persistence of race-related disadvantage should keep
us on notice about this hazard. Yet paying attention
to race in order to ameliorate past wrongs sometimes
supports the quest for social justice, as Dorothy Rob-
erts points out in this issue.' And at times, as Jay Cohn2
and Raj Bhopa 3 note, attention to race can make a
therapeutic difference, to the point of saving lives.
Thus the challenge when medical researchers use
racial categories is one of risk management. My aim
in this commentary is to offer some guidelines for risk
management by academic institutions, corporate and
public funders, journal editors, regulators, and inves-
tigators themselves. I start with the proposition that
past racial injustice is an important factor in assessing
risk: what has happened is evidence of what might
happen. 4 As critical race theorists point out, biological
understandings of race have repeatedly lent support
to beliefs in racial hierarchy and inferiority. Supposed
biological differences have had a central role in the "sci-
entific" stories about race told by apartheid theorists,
American white supremacists, anti-Semites, and as-
sorted other theorists of bigotry. So it is not mere politi-
cal correctness to caution that race-based physiologi-
cal distinctions could feed negative attitudes toward
groups portrayed as biologically less well-equipped.
Beyond this risk, there is the question of subjective
fear - fear sustained by memory of past episodes of bio-
logically rationalized repression. Should fear and anxi-
ety of this sort "count," for risk management purposes,
even when those who don't share it see no risk that
use of racial categories will rekindle racist beliefs and
behavior? Today's debate over the role of racial group-
ing in medical research is driven mostly by differences
over how to answer this question. Those who worry
a great deal about the rekindling of biological racism
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believe, of course, that their worries are well-founded.
Meanwhile, many who worry less, or not at all, about
this prospect see such fears as inflated and unworthy
of a role in the calculus of risks and benefits that arise
from use of racial categories.
These worries should "count," I submit, since there is
no firm basis for determining whether they are exag-
gerated, and since the wounded feelings (and trust)
of people affected matter greatly. Indeed, it is part of
our legacy of race-related indignity that hidden suf-
We shouldn't sacrifice lives or health mer
avoid classifying patients by race.
fering of this sort has often gone neglected. Race, for
this reason, should always be a "suspect" class in clini-
cal research, not in the strong sense implied by equal
protection law (which requires a "compelling" case for
race-based distinctions5), but in the literal sense that
using race should raise doubt. Avoidance of racial cat-
egories unless there is good scientific reason for using
them would be a wise starting premise.
But we should set this presumption aside when
scientific and clinical opportunity supports doing so;
we shouldn't sacrifice lives or health merely to avoid
classifying patients by race. The BiDil affair spotlights
the awkward choices we must make along these lines,
under real-world circumstances. As Jonathan Kahn has
shown in his authoritative account, BiDil's emergence
as a treatment for African-Americans with heart fail-
ure was a product of regulatory incentives as much as
scientific opportunity.6 Race-based prescribing offered
a pathway to extended patent protection for a combi-
nation therapy made up of two decades-old generics
(hydralazine and isosorbide dinitrate). Kahn and oth-
ers object to these incentives and to race-based clinical
decision-making more generally. But the clinical trial
that resulted in BiDil's approval produced a stunning
result: compared to conventional therapies alone, the
BiDil combination (administered with conventional
treatment) improved the one-year survival rate of heart
failure patients by forty-three percent.
This trial, conducted on African-Americans alone in
order to obtain Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approval for BiDil's patent-protected, race-based use,
didn't prove that BiDil works better in blacks than in
whites. But it did establish that the hydralazine/isosor-
bide dinitrate combination prolongs black heart failure
patients' lives. To argue that the trial shouldn't have
been conducted, or that the FDA shouldn't have ap-
proved BiDil based on this data, is to put opposition to
race-based categories ahead of extension of life. This,
I submit, takes resistance to race-based therapeutics
(and research) too far.
To be sure, as some have pointed out, BiDil could
have been tested on a multi-racial, multi-ethnic patient
pool.7 But as a practical matter, this wasn't an option
for the small, start-up company that brought Bidil to
market. Race-specific use meant extension of BiDil's
patent protection from 2007 to 2020, enabling the
firm to raise funds via equity markets to support a trial
in African-Americans only. A multi-racial trial, by con-
trast, lacked a Wall Street constituency:
impending loss of patent protection in
'ely to 2007 made such a trial unappealing to
investors and thus exceedingly difficult
to finance. Thus the BiDil affair poses
policy and ethics questions under third-
best circumstances. Had the trial not been conducted
in a single racial group,8 it almost certainly wouldn't
have been done, given prevailing business incentives.
Patients with heart failure would have missed out on
the hydralazine/isosorbide dinitrate combination's life-
prolonging benefits.
This would have been an unacceptable outcome, in
my view. The opportunity to save lives justified the
BiDil investigators' departure from the initial pre-
sumption against racial categories that I believe should
govern. On the other hand, the controversy over BiDil's
approval, despite the BiDil trial's stunningly positive
results, points to the need to better manage the social
risks of racial classification. When researchers use race
on an interim basis, as a surrogate for poorly-under-
stood environmental or genetic factors, reporting of
results should be accompanied by clear explanation
that race is a crude, temporary stand-in for causal in-
fluences that remain unknown. Journal editors should
insist on this, and regulators at the FDA and elsewhere
should underscore this message when they approve
tests and treatments, labeling, or third-party payment
on race-related grounds. Clarity of this sort, from those
in position to shape public perceptions, would go far
toward preventing reification of observed, race-cor-
related clinical differences as essential truths about
human nature and worth.
Beyond this, it is essential that use of racial categories
be temporary. Follow-up research aimed at uncovering
the genetic, social, and other determinants that under-
lie race-correlated differences should be a high priority,
to improve clinical outcomes and to discourage race-
based stigma. Were rewards for scientific understand-
ing and clinical advance the only drivers of medical
research, this challenge would take care of itself. But
perverse incentives in this area are a serious problem.
Pharmaceutical firms, driven by the exigencies of FDA
approval and intellectual property law, are the main
JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS
M. Gregg Bloche
funders of drug trials (and of many of the academics
who perform them). That these firms seek business op-
portunity on behalf of their shareholders doesn't make
them "bad"; to the contrary, they are required to do so
to meet their fiduciary obligations under corporate law.
But from a social welfare perspective, research efforts
driven by business incentives are imperfect. Absent the
prospect of economic reward, scientific questions risk
going ignored.
Troublesome incentives of this sort could "lock in"
use of race as a clinical indication, once a drug is ap-
proved (and patent-protected) for a particular racial
group. From the perspective of the drug's maker (and
prospective investors), follow-up studies aimed at find-
ing genetic or environmental markers for the drug's
effectiveness are likely to be a losing proposition. Once
race becomes established as a therapeutic indication,
discovery of factors that foretell treatment success for
only some patients within the racial category is likely to
be bad news for the manufacturer. Knowledge of these
factors shrinks the set of potential customers from all
members of the racial group to only those for whom
these factors apply. Unless this shrinkage is outweighed
by new customers (from other racial categories) for
whom these markers predict treatment success, find-
ings from follow-up study of genetic and environmen-
tal determinants will reduce sales of a product targeted
toward a particular racial group.9
The risk of locking in race as a clinical indication
is thus an example of a larger problem - the insuffi-
ciency of current regulatory and market incentives as
drivers of clinically desirable research. 1° Barring use of
racial categories is a near-sighted remedy; the larger
need is for correction of perverse incentives. Various
strategies, alone and in combination, are worth con-
sidering. The most far-reaching approach is large-scale
public financing for "orphan" research - research that
is clinically important, even urgent, but that goes un-
funded (and undone) under current arrangements."
This remedy would address a wide array of problems,
including the paucity of comparative-efficacy studies,
risk-benefit evaluations, and other research aimed at
putting clinical practice on a more rational, evidence-
based footing. To minimize interest group influence
and to maximize the clinical and scientific value of the
research performed, peer review panels should evalu-
ate competing proposals for such studies and deter-
mine their priority for funding purposes, as happens
now for grants awarded by the National Institutes of
Health (NIH).
The NIH, in my view, would be the best venue for
a program of this sort. Its prestige has proven to be a
powerful safeguard against the sway of potent inter-
est groups. Equally important is its durability, which
has enabled it to build a constituency of researchers
who rely on it for funding and who are thus insulated,
albeit not immunized,12 from the enticements of the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. A public
program along these lines, consuming, say, one or two
percent of the more than $2 trillion Americans spend
on health care each year, would dramatically increase
the resources available for "orphan" research, including
efforts to uncover mechanisms responsible for race-
related clinical differences.
A more modest approach would be to empower
the FDA to condition approval of a new drug on its
manufacturer's commitment to support follow-up re-
search, including studies of comparative efficacy and
of mechanisms that might underlie race-related clini-
cal outcome differencesY1 Ideally, this follow-on re-
search should be planned and conducted by indepen-
dent scientists, protected from industry influence by
robust conflict-of-interest rules. Approval could later
be revoked, suspended, or renewed, depending on the
outcomes of this research. This would put the burden
of performing such research on drug-makers, not tax-
payers. It might slow the emergence of low-value, "me
too" drugs while spurring research aimed at learning
whether new drugs represent substantial therapeutic
advances. For this approach to succeed, the FDA would
need to be reconstituted in wholesale fashion, as an
agency insulated from interest group influence and
staffed (or at least advised) by leaders in research on
clinical outcomes and pharmacotherapeutic mecha-
nisms.
A voluntary, industry-wide commitment to follow-
up research on genetic and environmental determi-
nants of racial differences in drug efficacy would be
helpful as an interim step. There are numerous prec-
edents from other industries for international action of
this sort when social and ethical concerns arise. Coffee,
cocoa, and clothing manufacturers have come together
to endorse fair labor standards, and firms that pollute
have embraced voluntary limits on the befouling of
water and air. To be sure, industry participation in such
standard-setting has been less than universal, and par-
ticipants at times fail to make good on their commit-
ments. But as students of these voluntary efforts point
out, they are most likely to succeed when they tackle
high-profile issues (of concern to those who purchase
an industry's products) and when a trade association
can coordinate and cajole its members. Racial clas-
sifications in pharmaceutical research and treatment
would seem to qualify on both counts: use of race as a
biological indicator is bitterly controversial, to say the
least, and the prescription drug industry may well have
the most potent trade group in Washington.
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Collective action by academic medical institutions
and professional organizations would also be of much
value. They should support the emergence of an ethi-
cal obligation to treat racial classification as an interim
measure, pending the search for genetic and environ-
mental determinants. This obligation implies a further
duty to search vigorously for such determinants when
race is employed as a clinical indication. Were clinical
researchers to take these obligations seriously and to
condition their collaboration with drug companies on
corporate commitment to fulfilling these obligations
- the risk of "locking-in" race-based therapies would
be much-diminished. This underscores the urgency
of dealing with a larger problem: financial linkage be-
tween clinical researchers and drug company incen-
tives. Clinical investigators should be reasonably paid
for the company-sponsored trials they perform, but
their financial incentives should be unconnected to trial
outcomes. Researchers should not hold stock options
in the sponsoring firm, as the BiDil patent holder (who
coauthored the study that led to BiDil's approval) did;
nor should they own shares outright. Other incentive
arrangements should be barred, and the subsequent
awarding of consulting fees, grants, and other benefits
should be closely policed by academic administrators.
My bottom line message about race-based classifica-
tion in clinical research is that we should start with
a presumption against it, but permit its use when it
might prolong lives or meaningfully improve health.
Use of racial categories should be understood as an
interim step; follow-up inquiry into the factors that
underlie race-correlated clinical differences is impor-
tant both to improve the efficacy of clinical care and
to prevent race in itself from being misunderstood as
a biological determinant. So long as we pursue such
inquiry with vigor - and communicate effectively about
the limited relevance of race as a surrogate for poorly-
understood genetic and environmental influences
- the pernicious effects of racial categories on pub-
lic understanding can be managed. Perverse market
and regulatory incentives create the danger that use
of race will be "locked-in," once drugs or other thera-
pies are approved. Follow-up research into underlying
determinants of difference in disease expression and
therapeutic response risks shrinking markets for medi-
cines approved on the basis of race. This risk is one
facet of the more general problem of under-funding
for "orphan" research, studies that promise large clini-
cal benefits but offer low economic payoffs, given pre-
vailing incentives. Addressing this mismatch between
therapeutic possibility and business opportunity is an
urgent public health priority.
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